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Some investigators of the rubber hand illusion (RHI) have suggested that when standard RHI induction procedures
are employed, if the rubber hand is experienced by participants as owned, their corresponding biological hands are
experienced as disowned. Others have demurred: drawing upon a variety of experimental data and conceptual
considerations, they infer that experience of the RHI might include the experience of a supernumerary limb, but
that experienced disownership of biological hands does not occur. Indeed, some investigators even categorically
deny that any experimental paradigm has been employed or any evidence can be adduced to support the claim
that disownership experiences occur during the RHI. It goes without saying that RHI experiences can be elusive,
and that there is some evidence to support claims that supernumerary limb experiences can sometimes occur.
Here, however, we test the claim that the conscious experience of disownership can occur during the RHI. In order
to test this claim, we developed two new online proxies—onset time for the illusion and illusion duration—and
combined these with established questionnaires that concern the conscious contents of the RHI, in particular
ownership/disownership experiences. Both online proxy data and post hoc questionnaire data converge in
supporting the claim that disownership experiences do occur, at least when the left hand is the object of
investigation. Our findings that onset time and illusion duration are reliable measures suggest that investigations of
the RHI stand to benefit by devoting more attention to data collected while the RHI is being experienced, in
particular data concerning temporal dynamics.
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Clinicians occasionally encounter patients who feel that
one of their limbs—usually the left arm or leg—belongs
to someone other than self. Somatoparaphrenia and
body integrity identity disorder are examples of such dis-
orders. This phenomenon—the conscious experience of
body disownership—is not well understood. Our re-
search demonstrates how, using an established para-
digm, this phenomenon can be induced and investigated
in healthy participants.* Correspondence: timlane@tmu.edu.tw; timothylane@gate.sinica.edu.tw;
suling@ntu.edu.tw
†Equal contributors
1Graduate Institute of Humanities in Medicine, Taipei Medical University,
Taipei, Taiwan
8Department of Psychology, National Taiwan University, No. 1, Sec. 4,
Roosevelt Road, Taipei 10617, Taiwan
Full list of author information is available at the end of the article
© The Author(s). 2017 Open Access This article
International License (http://creativecommons.o
reproduction in any medium, provided you giv
the Creative Commons license, and indicate ifBackground
Rubber hand illusion
In daily life we assume that hands belong to us when
they are connected to our bodies in the usual way, and
that artificial hands not so connected cannot be ours.
But Tastevin (1937) produced evidence to suggest that
artificial hands could be experienced as belonging to self
when participants simply look at an artificial hand that
is appropriately aligned with body position and posture
(cf., Schaefer, Heinze, & Rotte, 2009; Ferri, Chiarelli,
Merla, Gallese, & Costantini, 2013). This belonging or
ownership illusion was replicated by Botvinick and Co-
hen (1998) under experimental conditions that incorpo-
rated tactile sensation. The phenomenon, what has
come to be known as the rubber hand illusion (RHI),
has since been further replicated, by various techniques,
multiple times (for reviews, see Ehrsson, 2009, 2012;
Makin, Holmes, & Ehrsson, 2008; Tsakiris et al, 2010;is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
rg/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
e appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to
changes were made.
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Ora, Ide, & Kansaku, 2016).
In the standard version of RHI, an artificial hand is ex-
perienced as belonging to self when a participant ob-
serves strokes applied with a paint brush to a rubber
hand while, in synchrony, strokes are also being applied
to the occluded, biological hand. When strokes are ap-
plied asynchronously, the illusion either fails to occur or
is less vivid, although individual sensitivity to perceiving
asynchrony varies as a function of a temporal binding
window (Costantini et al., 2016). Although the RHI often
exhibits an elusive quality (e.g., Hohwy, 2013), the sub-
jective experience of ownership can be investigated by
means of questionnaires that generate data amenable to
psychometric analyses (e.g., Longo, Schuur, Kammers,
Tsakiris, & Haggard, 2008). Indeed, because the illusion
can develop so quickly, amazed participants often spon-
taneously report that the rubber hand “comes alive,” that
it belongs to self (Ehrsson, 2012). This startling experi-
ence of ownership for a “hand” can even be elicited
when participants are looking at nothing but empty
space, provided that certain minimal conditions are sat-
isfied, in particular the synchrony of stroking (Guter-
stam, Gentile, & Ehrsson, 2013).
Is there also a disownership experience?
Although most investigations of the RHI focus on the
ownership experience, recently some tantalizing evi-
dence has been adduced to suggest that participants also
experience alienation from, or disownership for, the bio-
logical hand. For example, Longo et al. (2008; cf., Pres-
ton, 2013) discovered that participants deny that they
experience having three hands, while they do feel that
the biological hand disappears. In a follow-up study that
drew upon the same data set (Longo, Schuur, Kammers,
Tsakiris, & Haggard, 2009), they adduced further evi-
dence suggesting that disownership can be a significant
component of the illusion. Indeed qualitative analyses of
the RHI that employed interpretive phenomenological
analysis also suggest that participants experience disow-
nership for the biological hand (Lewis & Lloyd, 2010;
Moguillansky, O’Regan, & Petitmengen, 2013). A pos-
sible mechanism for inducing disownership is the at-
tenuation of neuronal responses in select multisensory
regions: that is, these attenuated responses prevent the
integration of multisensory signals for the biological
hand (Gentile, Guterstam, Brozzoli, & Ehrsson, 2013).
Additional support for the claim that disownership ex-
periences occur during the RHI derives from investiga-
tions into homeostatic, sensory, and immunological
processes. Moseley et al. (2008), for example, have
shown that the illusion engages homeostatic processes in
such a way that the skin temperature of the biological
hand decreases when participants experience ownershipfor the rubber hand, apparently because experienced dis-
ownership causes a selective reduction in blood flow
(see also Hohwy & Paton, 2010; Kammers, Rose, & Hag-
gard, 2011; Moseley, Gallace, & Spence, 2012). These
findings, however, should be taken with a grain of salt
for, in personal communication, J. Hohwy and others
have noted that this experiment is not replicated easily;
indeed, our group also failed to detect significant de-
creases in skin temperature.1 Most importantly, one
study by Rohde, Wold, Karnath, and Ernst (2013) dem-
onstrated that the cooling effect may be present in both
the synchronous and the control condition, suggesting
that the temperature effect may not be a direct result of
the illusion.
In a separate experiment concerning sensory process-
ing, Moseley et al. (2008) have also shown that RHI viv-
idness correlates with a diminished ability to accurately
determine the sequence in which tactile stimuli are de-
livered to the index fingers of the left and right bio-
logical hands. They attribute this diminished ability to a
decrease in weighting given to tactile information from
the biological hand. And Barnsley et al. (2011) have
shown that the vividness of the illusion correlates with
elevated histamine activity in the biological hand. This
elevation of activity they interpret as suggesting that the
biological limb is being “rejected.” These findings con-
verge in lending support to the view that experienced
disownership might be an important component of the
RHI.
But the claims about disownership have not gone un-
challenged; investigations of limb disownership have not
produced conclusive results (Guterstam & Ehrsson,
2012). Schutz-Bosbach, Tausche, and Weiss (2009), for
example, designed an experiment aimed at determining
whether or how conceptual interpretations of visual and
tactile sensations influence the RHI. Their findings led
them to infer that the biological hand is retained, not
disowned. Folegatti, de Vignemont, Pavani, Rossetti, and
Farne (2009) reached similar conclusions. They
employed prismatic lenses to create a visual-
proprioceptive conflict, albeit one that does not engen-
der the experience of ownership for the rubber hand.
They then compared results from this test to results
from a standard RHI that includes ownership. Because
in both cases they detected somatosensory changes in
the biological hand (viz., a slowing of reaction time to
tactile stimuli), they suggest that these objective changes
result not from disownership of the hand, but from the
brain not “knowing” where the biological hand is. Fi-
nally, they venture the categorical claim that “there is no
experimental setup that can artificially induce the expli-
cit sensation of disownership of one’s own hand.”
de Vignemont (2011) has also challenged the claim
that disownership experiences occur; indeed, she too
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support such claims. Her concerns are a mix of the
conceptual and the experimental. But she has clearly
articulated several issues that contribute to confusion
over what has been learned from RHI experiments,
and what can be learned. She agrees with the com-
monplace observation that reports of the experience
are variable and elusive, and then she underscores the
possible role that a widespread failure to distinguish
between the “experience of” and the “judgment of”
ownership might play in making this illusion so diffi-
cult to nail down. She also points out that experi-
mental paradigms tend to rely excessively on
questionnaires, tend to pay inadequate attention to
updating of “online representations of bodily proper-
ties”, and too often neglect observed dissociation be-
tween what one experiences and proprioceptive drift,
the most frequently employed objective measure of
ownership and disownership.Aims of this study
Within the framework of the RHI paradigm, there is
ample evidence that an illusion of ownership occurs for
the rubber hand. What remains unclear is whether,
within that same framework, an illusion—a conscious
experience—of disownership can occur for the biological
hand. Moreover, if there is in fact such an experience, it
remains unclear how stable or how robust it might be.
Our experiments focus on the contents of conscious
experience within the RHI, devoting special attention to
disownership. For this reason we designed a series of ex-
periments that began by first distinguishing clearly be-
tween what is experienced and what is inferred or
judged to be the case, while emphasizing that our con-
cern is with the former. Second, given the importance of
subjective report to our experimental aims, we drew
upon multiple, previously employed questionnaires,
seeking to determine whether responses to similar con-
tent that was differently phrased would converge. Third,
given the seeming elusiveness of the RHI as well as the
lack of adequate information concerning how it is expe-
rienced online, we employed novel, online proxies—on-
set time (OT) and illusion duration (ID). Finally, because
some evidence suggests that laterality is a factor relevant
to the emergence of disownership experiences, we con-
centrated on the left rather than on the right hand.
Alterations of the standard RHI paradigm suggest that
ownership experiences can be retained for the biological
hand (Ehrsson, 2009; Schaefer et al., 2009; Newport,
Pearce, & Preston, 2010; Guterstam, Petkova, & Ehrsson,
2011). Our aim is not to challenge these findings. In-
stead, our aim is to test the categorical denials that dis-
ownership experiences can occur within the RHI, bycollecting data on conscious experience as it is reported,
both while the experience is ongoing and after the fact.
Distinctive methodological approach
A commonly used behavioral proxy for the RHI is
proprioceptive drift. But several studies have raised
doubts about the reliability of drift as an indicator of
the ownership experience for the rubber hand (Rohde,
Luca, & Earnst, 2011; Zopf, Savage, & Williams, 2010;
Ehrsson, Spence, & Passingham, 2004; Fiorio et al.,
2011; Kammers et al., 2009). A more recent study,
however, seems to suggest that although drift and
ownership experience are positively correlated, cru-
cially, it is the conscious experience that seems to be
causing drift, not the reverse (Abdulkarim & Ehrsson,
2016). This is one of the factors motivating our focus
on the conscious contents of the RHI.
In view of the seeming unreliability of propriocep-
tive drift, our focus on conscious experience, and
the evidence suggesting that conscious experience
causes drift, we opted not to employ this behavioral
proxy. Instead, we used two online temporal mea-
sures: OT and ID. A few prior studies have recorded
OT (Ehrsson et al., 2004; Ehrsson, Wiech, Weiskopf,
Dolan, & Passingham, 2007; Lloyd, 2007), but previ-
ously the temporal dimension—whether OT or
ID—has never been employed as a proxy for the
RHI. Peled, Ritsner, Hirschmann, Geva, and Modai
(2000), despite not using OT as a proxy, did notice
that OT and illusion strength correlate in patients
with schizophrenia. We extrapolated from this inci-
dental finding, as well as the observation that the
illusion can begin as early as 10–20 s after the start
of synchronous stimulation (Lloyd, 2007; Ehrsson
et al., 2004), and designed three experiments that ex-
plicitly treated the temporal dimension, both OT and
ID, as potential online proxies for healthy partici-
pants; OT was used for the first two experiments,
and ID was used for the third. Although OT might
seem problematic, given that in some cases the
illusion can begin at the very moment the participant
observes the rubber hand, previous data nevertheless
suggest that waiting time tends to range between 5
and 116 s, with 27 s being the median (Slater, Perez-
Marcos, Ehrsson, & Sanchez-Vives, 2009).
The first experiment aimed at ascertaining
whether our claim that OT and illusion strength
correlate in healthy subjects could be confirmed,
even without first suggesting to the participants
what type of conscious content was under investiga-
tion. The second experiment applied findings from
the first in order to directly test the disownership
claim by combining a psychometric approach to
post hoc questionnaire data with online OT data.
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experiment, the third experiment employed a differ-
ent questionnaire, a different scale, and a different
online proxy, albeit one that also involves the tem-
poral dimension ID.
Surely even naïve participants could discern from
the experimental context that some experience rele-
vant to the rubber hand might be expected. But it is
not self-evident that this experience will be of own-
ership or disownership illusions. As a matter of fact,
individual difference in how the RHI is experienced
is to be expected (Haans, Kaiser, Bouwhuis, & Ijssel-
steijn, 2012). It could just as easily be only touch
referral—the feeling of touch on the rubber
hand—that is experienced, absent the richer phe-
nomenology involving ownership, because touch re-
ferral is actually the illusion’s most distinctive
perceptual event (Ehrsson, 2012).
Accordingly, in order to avoid suggesting any spe-
cific conscious content, for the first experiment we
included a common vertical–horizontal illusion in our
instructions, both to illustrate what an illusion is and
to distinguish illusion from inference or judgment.
Participants were told to indicate OT the moment
they experienced an illusion of some kind. We did
not divulge to them that the experiment was an in-
vestigation of ownership–disownership experiences.
Instead, to determine whether participants experi-
enced such illusions, we adopted items from the
Longo et al. (2008) questionnaire that had previously
been identified as relevant to ownership for the rub-
ber hand and disownership for the biological hand.
Emphasizing the experience–inference distinction is
important for this first experiment. A principal reason
is that prior results seem to strongly suggest that an
ownership experience for the rubber hand can occur.
But the contentious point is whether a complemen-
tary disownership experience can occur for the bio-
logical hand. The worry is that some participants who
have an ownership experience might then infer or
judge that their biological hand must have been dis-
owned, even if they had no such experience. Avoiding
conflation of experience and inference is crucial to
clearly determine the conscious contents of the RHI.
Having in the first experiment established the reliabil-
ity of OT as an online, in-the-moment proxy for the RHI
in healthy participants, and having established that par-
ticipants reported ownership and disownership experi-
ences without either having been suggested to them
prior to the experiment, in the second experiment we fo-
cused even more directly on the experience of disowner-
ship. Again we used the Longo et al. (2008)
questionnaire items in conjunction with OT measure-
ments. But here participants were instructed to use OTto indicate the moment of onset of either disownership
or ownership. For the third experiment, we sought add-
itional confirmation of findings concerning use of a tem-
poral, online proxy, by using ID, and additional
confirmation of subjective report by using an alternative
questionnaire and scale (Preston, 2013).
Throughout we focused only on the left hand. The
principal reason is that right hemisphere tactile acti-
vation tends to evince a more vivid illusion of own-
ership for the rubber hand (Ocklenburg, Ruther,
Peterburs, Pinnow, & Gunturkun, 2011). On the as-
sumption that experiences of ownership and disow-
nership are intrinsically related, we conjectured that
right hemisphere tactile activation also tends to
evince a more vivid illusion of disownership. In fact,
certain pathologies suggest that disownership experi-
ences are lateralized in just this way (Vallar &
Ronchi, 2009; Karnath & Baier, 2010; Giummarra,
Bradshaw, Hilti, Nicholls, & Brugger, 2012).
Significance of this study
Schutz-Bosbach et al. (2009), Folegatti et al. (2009),
de Vignemont (2011), and others adduce evidence to
infer that standard RHI induction procedures do not
or cannot induce disownership experiences for one’s
biological hand. Our investigations are designed to
test their views (1) by focusing on the conscious
content of the RHI; (2) by emphasizing the differ-
ence between experience and inference or judgment;
(3) by collecting data online, while participants are
having the experiences, and after the fact, using dual
measures for both; and (4) by focusing on just one
hand, the left. Proceeding in this way we are able to
marshal support for the view that not only can dis-
ownership occur during the RHI, but also that dis-
ownership is consciously experienced.
Experiment 1
Overview and hypothesis
Two measures were used to determine whether stand-
ard RHI induction procedures bring about disowner-
ship experiences. First, the OT was recorded while
biological and rubber hands were being stroked. Sec-
ond, after completion of the experiment, a question-
naire designed to probe ownership of the rubber
hand and disownership of the real hand was adminis-
tered. If standard RHI induction procedures engender
disownership, the questionnaire should evince both
ownership of the rubber hand and disownership of
the biological hand, while the strength of both should
positively correlate with OTs. If standard RHI induc-
tion procedures do not engender disownership, how-
ever, it should neither be evinced by the
questionnaire nor correlate with OTs.
Fig. 1 The setup in Experiment 1, 2, and 3
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Participants
Thirty-two undergraduate participants were recruited
for this experiment. Because no previous studies had
used OT as an online proxy for the RHI, in order to con-
firm that despite some degree of individual difference it
could still serve as a valid measure, we increased the
sample size for standard, behavioral versions of the RHI
experiments from the typical 10–20 to 32. All partici-
pants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and no
known tactile deficits. All were naïve about the purpose
of this experiment, and no one among them had previ-
ously participated in a RHI experiment. This study was
approved by the Department of Psychology Ethics Com-
mittee, National Taiwan University, and all participants
gave informed consent.
Experimental setup
Participants were individually tested in a small, quiet
room. The experimenter stood in front of the partici-
pant, who was seated with both hands placed on a table
top. Prior to beginning, participants were shown a verti-
cal–horizontal illusion and were advised that the test
was designed to see whether or not they would experi-
ence an illusion, of some unspecified kind. The purpose
of showing them this illusion was to illustrate the differ-
ence between what is experienced and what is judged to
be the case. As has been emphasized in the previous sec-
tion, given our special focus on the conscious contents
of the RHI, along with skepticism expressed by some in-
vestigators that the experience of disownership even oc-
curs, we found clarification of this distinction to be
crucial to our design.
First, participants were asked to insert their hands into
a black cardboard tube, so that they would be hidden
from view. Second, a towel was placed over the tube and
in such a way that it concealed participants’ elbows and
forearms, as well as the space separating the rubber
hand from the body. Third, the experimenter proceeded
to use two paintbrushes to stroke corresponding fingers
of the rubber and biological hands, at an approximate
rate of one stroke per 2 s, and continuing for a period of
5 min (Fig. 1). Because evidence suggests right hemi-
spheric dominance for the experience of body ownership
(Ocklenburg et al., 2011), strokes were applied to the
real left hand and a corresponding left, rubber hand.
The left hand was used for all three experiments. Two
foot pedals connected to a computer were placed under
the participants’ feet to measure OTs (Fig. 2a).
Design and procedure
Two conditions were administered for each participant:
synchronous and asynchronous stroking, with the order
counterbalanced across participants. In both conditionsthe experimenter stroked the rubber hand and partici-
pants’ real hands, attempting to induce the RHI. Partici-
pants were required to keep looking at the rubber hand
and to avoid postural adjustments. As soon as the ex-
perimenter started stroking both the rubber and bio-
logical hands, participants were required to step on the
left pedal. Participants had also been instructed: “During
the course of the experiment, if you experience an
illusion, please step down on the right pedal, immedi-
ately.” After stroking of the hands was completed, partic-
ipants were asked to fill out a questionnaire (Appendix).
Finally, upon completion of the questionnaire, the entire
procedure was repeated for the other condition: that is,
if the first condition involved synchronous stroking, the
second would be asynchronous.
Questionnaire
The questionnaire comprised ten items adopted from
Longo et al. (2008). To focus on the subjective report of
experiencing ownership for the rubber hand and disow-
nership for the real hand, we selected the ownership and
disownership (or, “loss of own hand”) items from the
study of Longo et al. Items 1–5 reflected rubber hand
ownership; items 6–10 reflected real hand disownership.
Responses for each item were indicated on a seven-point
Likert scale, from −3 to 3. Positive responses to item 7,
“It seemed like I could have moved my hand if I had
wanted”, were coded inversely (viz., a response of +3 was
coded as −3).
Because of the concern that investigations of this sort
fail to adequately distinguish between what is experi-
enced and what is judged to be the case (e.g., de Vigne-
mont, 2011), before responding to the questionnaire
participants were instructed to base their ratings on
what they consciously experience rather than on what
they judged or inferred to be the case. As noted, a com-
mon vertical–horizontal illusion was used to illustrate
the distinction before participants took part in the ex-
periment. It was emphasized to participants that the
phenomenon of interest was analogous to experiencing
Fig. 2 Temporal dimension as a measure of the rubber hand illusion, both for ownership and disownership. a Onset time; b illusion duration.
Concerning duration, if a participant’s illusion comes and goes, illusion duration is the sum of all illusion experience periods
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ent length, in the sense that what matters is “how things
seem to be”. In this way, we tried to minimize the possi-
bility that participants who experienced ownership then
inferred that disownership must have also occurred.
Results for Experiment 1
Onset time for the illusion
We used mean ± 2.5 standard deviations (SD) as cut-off
criteria and no participants had to be excluded in
follow-up analyses. By measuring the elapsed time from
the moment that the left foot pedal was pressed (when
stroking of hands begins) to the moment when the right
foot pedal was pressed (when participants begin experi-
encing the RHI), we obtained the OT of the RHI for
each participant. For trials when participants did not
step on the right pedal before cessation of the stroking,
OT was recorded as 300 s (duration of stroking); this en-
sured that no cells were left empty. (In Experiment 3 we
show that this methodological compromise did not con-
taminate our data.) A one-way repeated measure analysisFig. 3 Experiment 1 results. a Mean onset times measured under synchron
ownership and disownership items. RHI rubber hand illusionof variance (ANOVA) on OT showed a significant differ-
ence between synchronous and asynchronous stroking
(F(1, 31) = 34.193, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.5245). In other words,
participants experienced RHI more quickly when the
stroking was synchronous than when it was asynchron-
ous (Fig. 3a).
Questionnaire
We categorized items 1–5 as ownership items, and 6–10
as disownership items. We then conducted a two-way
repeated measure ANOVA concerning the synchron-
ous–asynchronous difference and ownership type—that
is, ownership versus disownership items (Fig. 3b). Both
the main effects of the synchrony–asynchrony difference
(F(1, 31) = 59.907, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.6590) and ownership
type (F(1, 31) = 48.643, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.6108) were sig-
nificant. Moreover, interaction between the synchrony–
asynchrony difference and ownership type was also sig-
nificant (F(1, 31) = 6.876, p < 0.05, ηp
2 = 0.1815). Simple
main effects revealed that both ownership and disowner-
ship items were rated more positively under theous and asynchronous stroking conditions; b mean rating scores for
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condition, and ownership items were rated more posi-
tively than disownership items under both synchronous
and asynchronous conditions. None of the post hoc
Tukey tests were significant.
To test whether there was any relationship between
the experiences of rubber hand ownership and biological
hand disownership, we calculated the correlation be-
tween scores of ownership items and disownership
items, using the difference scores between the synchron-
ous and the asynchronous conditions. We discovered a
significant correlation between ownership and disowner-
ship (r = 0.38, p < 0.05). That is to say, the more strongly
a participant experienced a feeling of ownership for the
rubber hand, the more strongly they experienced a feel-
ing of disownership for the real hand.
Correlation between onset time and questionnaire
To further probe the relationship between strength of
the illusion as reflected by questionnaire ratings and the
emergence of the illusory experience, we calculated two
correlations. Both the correlations between OT and
ownership items (r = −0.39, p < 0.05) and between OT
and disownership items (r = −0.35, p < 0.05), when the
asynchronous condition was subtracted from the syn-
chronous condition, were significant. These two correla-
tions revealed that the more quickly participants
experienced the illusion, the stronger were the ratings of
ownership for the rubber hand and disownership for the
biological hand items, and vice versa. In short, the ex-
perience of RHI is reflected not only by questionnaire
item ratings, but also by OT.
Discussion for Experiment 1
In this experiment, we established that ownership and
disownership experiences were identifiable to naïve par-
ticipants, even though it was only suggested to them that
they would experience an illusion of some kind. Second,
we have shown that OT can be a reliable online proxy
for measuring these two experiential aspects of the RHI:
OT correlated with the vividness of ownership for the
rubber hand, as well as vividness of disownership for the
biological hand. That is, the earlier the onset of the RHI,
the stronger the experience of ownership for the rubber
hand and disownership for the biological hand, as
reflected by questionnaire ratings. Third, we showed a
significant positive correlation between ownership for
the rubber hand and disownership for the biological
hand. These results support the disownership view; they
suggest that during the standard RHI induction proced-
ure, at least when it is applied to the left hand, if the
rubber hand is experienced as owned, the biological
hand is likewise consciously experienced as disowned.
Indeed, the more strongly participants experiencedownership for the rubber hand, the more strongly they
experienced disownership for the biological hand.
Experiment 2
Overview and hypothesis
In Experiment 1, we asked participants to indicate the
moment at which they began to experience an illusion.
Questionnaire responses reflected that participants were
able to distinguish between the experience of ownership
and that of disownership, and that these responses cor-
related with their online recording of OT. Accordingly,
we surmised that the OT measure can also be employed
to distinguish between these two experiences when par-
ticipants are aware of what type of illusion to expect. To
verify this, for Experiment 2 we asked participants to in-
dicate the instant when they began to experience owner-
ship of the rubber hand, as well as the instant they
began to experience disownership of the biological hand.
We predicted that, if the disownership view holds true:
(1) OTs for both ownership and disownership would be
earlier under the synchronous than the asynchronous
condition; (2) ownership and disownership OTs would
correlate; and (3) ownership–disownership ratings would
correlate with ownership–disownership OTs.
Methods
Participants
Twenty participants were recruited. Because we had
already established the validity of timing as an online
proxy for the illusion (both ownership and disowner-
ship), thereby reducing concerns about individual differ-
ence, we adopted the sample size common to prior
investigations of the RHI (e.g., Ocklenburg et al., 2011;
Preston, 2013; Rohde et al., 2011). All participants were
college students, who were naïve as regards the RHI ex-
periment, and all gave informed consent. All had normal
or corrected-to-normal vision, and no known tactile def-
icits. Moreover, all were given a modest remuneration
for their participation. This study was approved by the
Department of Psychology Ethics Committee, National
Taiwan University.
Experimental setup, design, procedure, and questionnaire
Methods were the same as those employed in Experi-
ment 1, except for the criteria used to decide when the
illusion begins. Here, participants were required to re-
spond based upon two distinct “belonging” criteria
(Lane, 2012, 2014, 2015): the experience of ownership
for the rubber hand (criterion 1) and the experience of
disownership for the biological hand (criterion 2). We
asked participants to step on the pedal as soon as they
began to feel the rubber hand was their real hand and,
likewise, when they began to feel their real hand no lon-
ger belonged to them. The order of the criteria was
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felt a belonging criterion was satisfied—at the instant of
first experiencing ownership or disownership—they were
required to step on the pedal, thereby recording the OT.
For this experiment, each participant was presented with
four conditions: synchronous and asynchronous stroking
while testing for disownership, and synchronous and
asynchronous stroking while testing for ownership. So as
not to confuse participants by repetitive changing of cri-
teria, we balanced conditions of belonging criteria, so
that one criterion was conducted with both the syn-
chronous and asynchronous conditions first, before pro-
ceeding to the next criterion. In other words, if on the
first trial a participant was tested for disownership using
synchronous stroking, on the second trial testing would
be for disownership using asynchronous stroking, on the
third trial testing would be for ownership using syn-
chronous stroking, and on the fourth trial testing would
be for ownership using asynchronous stroking.
Results for Experiment 2
Onset time for the illusion
We used mean ± 2.5 SD as cut-off criteria and one of the
participants was excluded in follow-up analyses. We
conducted a two-way repeated measure ANOVA con-
cerning the synchronous–asynchronous difference and
belonging type (Fig. 4a). Both the main effects of the
synchrony–asynchrony difference (F(1, 18) = 339.638, p
< 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.9497) and belonging type (F(1, 18) =
32.197, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.6414) were significant. This sug-
gests that participants experienced the feeling of owner-
ship and disownership more quickly under the
synchronous stroking condition than the asynchronous
stroking condition, and experienced the feeling of own-
ership faster than disownership. The interaction between
the synchrony–asynchrony difference and belonging type
was also significant (F(1, 18) = 16.027, p < 0.001, ηp
2 =
0.4710). The simple main effect reveals that bothFig. 4 Experiment 2 results. a Mean onset times measured under synchron
ownership and disownership items. RHI rubber hand illusionownership and disownership were experienced more
quickly under the synchronous than the asynchronous
condition, and that ownership was experienced more
quickly than disownership under the synchronous condi-
tion, but that there was no difference between ownership
and disownership obtained under the asynchronous con-
dition. These data imply that participants experienced
ownership for the rubber hand prior to disownership for
the biological hand, but that if they did not experience
ownership, neither did they experience disownership.
Furthermore, we assessed the relationship between the
OTs of ownership and disownership, when the asyn-
chronous condition was subtracted from the synchron-
ous condition. Here, too, we discovered a significant
correlation (r = 0.56, p < 0.001). This discovery implies
that the more quickly participants experience ownership
for the rubber hand, the more quickly they experience
disownership for the biological hand.
Questionnaire
We conducted a two-way repeated measure ANOVA
concerning the synchronous–asynchronous difference
and belonging type (Fig. 4b). Both the main effects of
the synchrony–asynchrony difference (F(1, 18) = 24.641,
p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.5779) and belonging type (F(1, 18) =
16.879, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.4839) were significant. This is to
say, participants were more likely to affirm questionnaire
items under the synchronous condition than under the
asynchronous condition, and ownership items were
more strongly affirmed than disownership items. There
was also a significant interaction between the syn-
chrony–asynchrony difference and belonging type (F(1,
18) = 14.189, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.4408). In addition, simple
main effects revealed that both ownership and disowner-
ship items were rated more positively under the syn-
chronous condition than under the asynchronous
condition, and ownership items were rated more posi-
tively than disownership items under the synchronousous and asynchronous stroking conditions; b mean rating scores for
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None of the post hoc Tukey tests were significant.
In addition, we calculated the correlation between
scores of ownership items and disownership items when
the asynchronous condition was subtracted from the
synchronous condition. We again discovered a signifi-
cant correlation between ownership and disownership (r
= 0.69, p < 0.001). In short, the stronger the experience
of ownership for the rubber hand, the stronger the ex-
perience of disownership for the biological hand, and
vice versa.
Correlation between onset time and questionnaire
To further probe the relationship between questionnaire
ratings and OTs, we calculated the correlation between
ownership questionnaire scores and ownership OTs, as
well as the correlation between disownership question-
naire scores and disownership OTs. Both correlations
were significant (ownership: r = −0.44, p < 0.05; disow-
nership: r = −0.44, p < 0.05). That is, the earlier the onset
of ownership or disownership, the more robustly were
those illusions experienced.
Discussion for Experiment 2
In this experiment, having already established that OT
can serve as a reliable online proxy for the RHI even
when participants are unaware of what type of illusion
to expect, we focused even more directly on the disow-
nership hypothesis. Again using the Longo et al. (2008)
questionnaire in conjunction with OT measurements,
we confirmed that participants could both clearly iden-
tify the type of belonging experience and indicate the
moment of disownership or ownership onset. Moreover,
these OT results significantly correlated with responses
to questionnaire items. In sum, Experiment 2 results in-
dicate that OT for both disownership and ownership sig-
nificantly correlate with questionnaire responses, that
disownership and ownership correlate with one another,
and that the earlier the onset of either illusion, the more
vivid the experience, for both types of belonging experi-
ence. The discovery that the more quickly participants
experience ownership for the rubber hand, the more
quickly they experience disownership for the biological
hand supports our conjecture that disownership and
ownership are related intrinsically.
Experiment 3
Overview and hypothesis
In Experiments 1 and 2, we asked participants to rate
ownership items and disownership items adopted from
Longo et al. (2008) and to indicate OT. For Experiment
3, three principal changes were made. First, because
Longo et al. did not include control items, and in order
to determine whether the manner in which ownership–disownership queries were expressed could alter results,
we added a questionnaire used by Preston (2013; cf.,
Guterstam et al., 2011) that includes controls and alter-
native formulations of questionnaire items. We conjec-
tured that if the ownership–disownership experiences
are sufficiently distinct, semantic differences between the
two questionnaires would not significantly affect the re-
sults. Second, we amended the numerical scale that is
typically matched to questionnaires of this sort so that it
more clearly indicated whether participants intended to
affirm experiencing disownership, as opposed to merely
indicating uncertainty. Third, to further explore the util-
ity of the temporal dimension as an online proxy for
ownership–disownership experiences, as well as to avoid
the need to attribute a 300 s OT to participants who did
not experience the RHI, we investigated ID to determine
whether it too might evince the same pattern of correla-
tions as those evinced by OT.
Methods
Participants
Twelve participants were recruited. This sample size es-
timate was based on the large effect sizes obtained in
Experiment 2; we therefore reduced the sample size to
that which has been adopted for similar RHI experi-
ments (e.g., Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; Folegatti et al.,
2009; Morgan et al., 2011). All participants were naïve as
regards the RHI experiment, all gave informed consent,
and all were given a modest remuneration for their par-
ticipation. All had normal or corrected-to-normal vision,
and no known tactile deficits. This study was approved
by the Department of Psychology Ethics Committee, Na-
tional Taiwan University.
Experimental setup, design, procedure, and questionnaire
Stimuli and procedures were very much the same as
those employed in Experiments 1 and 2. The critical dif-
ferences were as follows: first, we gave participants two
questionnaires. One was the same as that used previ-
ously, while the other (Appendix) contained control
items and alternative formulations of questionnaire
items (Preston, 2013). The order of the two question-
naires was counterbalanced among participants. Second,
rather than using a −3 to +3 Likert scale, we used an 11-
point, 0–10 numerical scale. The intent here was disam-
biguation: for example, on the commonly used Likert
scale a selection near 0 might be interpreted as suggest-
ing that the participant experienced nothing. But when
the numerical scale only includes positive numbers, a se-
lection near the mid-point more clearly indicates affirm-
ation that an illusion experience occurred.
In order to time the illusion, participants were asked
to step down on the right pedal as soon as they experi-
enced the illusion begin and the left foot pedal as soon
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repeat this procedure if the illusion started again. The
difference between the time points when the two pedals
were pressed was calculated as the duration [t(left pedal)
– t(right pedal)], and the sum of these durations was
indexed as the ID.
Results for Experiment 3
Illusion duration
We used mean ±2.5 SD as the cut-off criteria and no
participants had to be excluded from follow-up analyses.
We conducted a one-way repeated measure ANOVA
concerning the synchronous–asynchronous difference
and ID (Fig. 5a). The main effects of the synchrony–
asynchrony difference were significant (F(1, 11) = 20.409,
p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.6498). This shows that participants ex-
perienced the feeling of ownership longer under the syn-
chronous stroking condition than under the
asynchronous stroking condition.
Questionnaire
First, we conducted a two-way repeated measure
ANOVA concerning the synchronous–asynchronous dif-
ference and belonging type based on data collected from
Longo et al.’s (2008) questionnaire. The main effects of
the synchrony–asynchrony difference (F(1, 11) = 9.855,
p < 0.01, ηp
2 = 0.4725) were significant. This is to say,
items were rated more positively under the synchronous
condition than under the asynchronous condition. There
was also a significant interaction between the syn-
chrony–asynchrony difference and belonging type (F(1,
11) = 5.210, p < 0.05, ηp
2 = 0.3214). In addition, simple
main effects revealed that both ownership and disowner-
ship items were rated more positively under the syn-
chronous than under the asynchronous condition, and
ownership items were rated more positively than disow-
nership items under the synchronous condition, but not
the asynchronous condition. None of the post hoc Tukey
tests were significant.Fig. 5 Experiment 3 results. a Mean ownership durations measured under
scores for ownership, control, and disownership items in Preston’s (2013) qSecond, we conducted a two-way repeated measure
ANOVA concerning the synchronous–asynchronous dif-
ference and belonging type in Preston’s (2013) question-
naire (Fig. 5b). The main effects of the synchrony–
asynchrony difference (F(1, 11) = 8.985, p < 0.05, ηp
2 =
0.4596) were significant. This is to say, items were rated
more positively under the synchronous condition than
under the asynchronous condition. There was also a sig-
nificant interaction between synchronous–asynchronous
difference and belonging type (F(1, 11) = 8.101, p < 0.05,
ηp
2 = 0.4241). In addition, simple main effects revealed
that both ownership and disownership items were rated
more positively under the synchronous condition than
under the asynchronous condition, and ownership items
were rated more positively than disownership items
under the synchronous condition, but not under the
asynchronous condition. As for control items, there was
no significant difference between synchronous and asyn-
chronous conditions, indicating that the difference be-
tween synchronous and asynchronous in ownership and
disownership items was not due to response bias. More-
over, the post hoc Tukey indicated that the ownership
items were rated more positively than control items in
the synchronous condition (p < 0.05) and the disowner-
ship items were rated more positively than control items
in the synchronous condition (p < 0.05). There were also
quadratic trends for both the synchronous condition
(F(1, 44) = 5.940, p < 0.05) and asynchronous condition
(F(1, 44) = 8.093, p < 0.01).
Third, we calculated the correlation between scores of
ownership items and disownership items when the asyn-
chronous condition was subtracted from the synchron-
ous condition for data collected from both
questionnaires. We discovered significant correlations
between ownership and disownership in Longo et al.’s
(2008) questionnaire (r = 0.59, p < 0.05) and in Preston’s
(2013) questionnaire (r = 0.63, p < 0.05). In short, the
stronger the experience of ownership for the rubber
hand, the stronger the experience of disownership forsynchronous and asynchronous stroking conditions; b mean rating
uestionnaire. RHI rubber hand illusion
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lated correlations between the two questionnaires: corre-
lations between ownership items (r = 0.57, p < 0.05) and
disownership items (r = 0.76, p < 0.01) for the two ques-
tionnaires were significant.
Correlation between illusion duration and questionnaire
We further probed the relationship between question-
naire ratings and ID. There were significant correlations
between the ownership–disownership questionnaire
items of Longo et al. (2008) and ID (ownership: r = 0.65,
p < 0.05; disownership: r = 0.66, p < 0.01), as well as be-
tween the ownership–disownership items of Preston
(2013) and ID (ownership: r = 0.55, p < 0.05; disowner-
ship: r = 0.65, p < 0.05). In other words, the longer the ID
of ownership, the more robustly felt was the illusion.
Discussion for Experiment 3
Experiment 3 achieved several goals: first, it confirmed
the utility of the temporal dimension as an indicator of
ownership, while also circumventing the need to make
methodological compromises, by demonstrating the ID’s
value as an online proxy. Second, results from Experi-
ments 1 and 2 were confirmed using a questionnaire
that contained alternative formulations of the question-
naire items as well as control items. Third, the validity
of ID as a measure suggests that this illusion is a stable,
not transient, phenomenon. In other words, this meth-
odological approach might help to reduce the sense that
the RHI is an elusive phenomenon. Finally, by using an
11-point numerical scale, we confirmed that mid-range
questionnaire responses are indeed affirmations that an
illusion was experienced.
Because one of the Preston (2013) questionnaire con-
trol items suggests the possibility of a supernumerary
limb, it might be wondered whether data from this item
conflicts with our focus on the experience of disowner-
ship. Although for future studies of this type it might be
advisable to more directly compare supernumerary with
disownership items, for our investigation, owing to our
special emphasis on subjective report, we decided to use
established questionnaires. Furthermore, the disowner-
ship items clearly concern disownership, while only one
of the control items clearly concerns the possibility of
experiencing a supernumerary limb. Finally, the differ-
ence between synchrony and asynchrony is more pro-




For the first experiment, we emphasized that our con-
cern was with what participants consciously experienced,
not what they inferred or judged to be the case;moreover, we avoided suggesting to them how that ex-
perience should be characterized. They were told only
that they might experience an illusion of some kind, and
were instructed to indicate the moment at which that
began (OT), if indeed they did experience an illusion.
Even without suggesting what might be experienced and
despite the caveat to avoid rendering judgments, ques-
tionnaire responses and OT combine to reflect that par-
ticipants did experience both ownership and
disownership, and that they experienced both more
quickly when hand stroking was synchronous than when
it was not.
In addition, questionnaire results showed that the
more strongly participants experienced ownership for
the rubber hand, the more strongly they experienced
disownership for the real hand. Crucially, the more
quickly participants indicated the experience of an
illusion, the stronger were their questionnaire ratings for
both ownership and disownership. Accordingly, it seems
that participants do undergo both ownership and disow-
nership experiences and that OT can serve as a useful,
online proxy for these experiences, perhaps even as a
substitute for drift given that drift seems to be a function
of conscious experience.
For the second experiment, having already established
that OT can serve as a reliable online proxy in healthy
participants, we focused more directly on the categorical
denials that disownership experiences occur. This time
participants were advised as regards the phenomena
under investigation and instructed to indicate OT for
both ownership and disownership experiences. Again,
ownership and disownership were experienced more
quickly when stroking was synchronous than when it
was not, and the more quickly ownership was experi-
enced the more quickly disownership was experienced.
Furthermore, rapidity of onset for both correlated with
the experienced strength of the illusions. Thus, consist-
ent with our conjecture, it seems that for standard ver-
sions of the RHI ownership and disownership might be
intrinsically related: the degree to which ownership is
experienced for the rubber hand, disownership is experi-
enced for the biological hand. When the OT and the
questionnaire data were conjoined, they augmented sup-
port for the view that disownership experiences do
occur.
For the third experiment, to safeguard against the pos-
sibility that the Longo et al. (2008) questionnaire items
and the rating scale might not adequately disambiguate
between disownership and other phenomena, or be-
tween disownership and uncertainty, we employed a re-
fined set of ownership–disownership items as well as
control items (Preston, 2013), along with a scale better
suited to assessing whether participants intended to af-
firm experience of disownership. Furthermore, in
Lane et al. Cognitive Research: Principles and Implications  (2017) 2:4 Page 12 of 14Experiments 1 and 2, methodological concerns com-
pelled us to attribute an OT of 300 s to those who
did not experience the RHI. Obviously, this meth-
odological necessity takes certain liberties with the
interpretation of “OT”. Accordingly, to demonstrate
that attribution of OT to those who did not experi-
ence the illusion did not contaminate the data, we
employed a different temporal component—ID—to
see whether it too could serve as a reliable online
proxy. Here, ID was recorded as zero if no illusion
was experienced. Not only did we again confirm that
the strength of disownership and ownership illusions
correlate, we also discovered that ID can, like OT,
serve as a useful proxy for these two components of
the RHI.
Disownership and multisensory integration
According to an emerging consensus within cogni-
tive neuroscience, the experience of owning one’s
body is dependent upon multisensory integration
(e.g., Ehrsson, 2012). Applied to the RHI, the con-
sensus view holds that participants integrate touch
felt on the biological hand with visible stroking of
the rubber hand, such that they do not experience
distinct unimodal events. Instead, they form a coher-
ent representation of a unified, multisensory
event—the experience of strokes applied to the rub-
ber hand (Makin et al., 2008). More directly relevant
to our concerns here, by virtue of integrating dis-
tinct stimuli into a coherent representation, partici-
pants then commonly report feeling that the rubber
hand belongs to self.
Although it should be noted that this view is not uni-
versally shared (e.g., Ferri et al., 2013), our findings are
broadly consistent with the multisensory integration
consensus. That is, one interpretation of our findings is
that disownership experiences result from a dynamic
process whereby the body’s representation, within peri-
personal space, is regularly updated to account for varied
sensory inputs that derive from different modalities. Our
findings seem as well to suggest that this ongoing multi-
sensory integration interacts with an internal, normative
body model that is biased towards integration of inputs,
in a way favoring a two-handed rather than a super-
numerary representation of the bodily self (Tsakiris et al,
2010; Tsakiris 2011). In the context of our experiments,
this dynamic process acts to create a coherent represen-
tation whereby the feeling that a hand that is attached to
one’s own body is experienced as having been disowned,
in effect replaced by the rubber hand.
But does the multisensory integration view help ex-
plain why OT correlates with the strength of the disow-
nership experience? We speculate that because visual
and tactile stimuli are usually processed within 100 ms(Vroomen & Keetels, 2010), while proprioception ex-
ceeds 200 ms (Fuentes, Gomi, & Haggard, 2012), it
might be that a coherent representation focused on
the rubber hand can be formed rather quickly, one
that draws principally upon just the visual and tactile
inputs. Delay of the proprioceptive signals might fa-
cilitate visual capture, because vision need only “cap-
ture” the tactile inputs (Pavani, Spence, & Driver,
2000). Indeed, perhaps it is for this same reason that
the conscious experience of ownership seems to be
the cause of drift, rather than the other way around
(Abdulkarim & Ehrsson, 2016).
Some support for this view can perhaps be found from
patients with schizophrenia spectrum disorders, given
that, among other things, they suffer from abnormalities
of proprioceptive processing (Arnfred, Raball, Morup, &
Parnas, 2015). These patients also tend to exhibit not-
ably early onset for the RHI (Peled et al., 2000; Peled,
Pressman, Geva, & Modai, 2003). Here, too, it might be
that proprioceptive dysfunction helps facilitate visual
capture. Our point is not that early onset of the RHI is
an indication of pathology, for there are participants
who are especially susceptible to the RHI and begin to
experience the illusion as early as 6 s after the start of
synchronous stroking without any indication of path-
ology (Lloyd, 2007). Instead, our suggestion is that early
onset of ownership and disownership, as well as the ro-
bustness of these illusions, might be partially due to nor-
mal ranges of variation in visual, tactile, and
proprioceptive processing that affect how multisensory
integration is achieved in any individual case.
Why are disownership experiences less vivid than
ownership experiences?
One might remain concerned that disownership for
the biological hand is consistently less robust than is
ownership for the rubber hand. This fact could be
taken as justification for the doubt that disownership
experiences occur during the standard RHI. That dis-
ownership is reported to be less vivid or less obvious
than ownership is, however, not surprising, because in
most experiments attention is directed primarily at
the rubber hand. It necessarily follows that participant
reports will reflect this intensity difference. Even in
our second experiment, wherein participants were
asked to monitor for disownership, a preponderance
of attentional resources remained focused on the rub-
ber hand because they had to visually attend to it.
The results from our study most directly relevant to
assessing whether disownership experiences occur are:
(1) the significant differences obtained between syn-
chronous and asynchronous stroking; (2) that owner-
ship and disownership appear to be intrinsically
related, at least in the sense that the more intensely
Table 2 Questionnaire used in Experiment 3
Preston (2013)
Ownership 1. It seemed as though I were feeling the touch in the
location where I saw the fake hand being touched.
2. It seemed as though the fake hand belonged to me.
3. It seemed as though the fake hand was part of my
body.
4. It seemed as though the touch I felt was caused by
the touch on the fake hand.
Control 5. It appeared (visually) as if the fake hand were drifting
towards my own (real) hand.
6. It seemed as if I might have more than one left hand
or arm.
Disownership 7. I felt as if my real hand no longer belonged to me.
8. It felt as though my real hand was no longer part of
my body.
9. It felt as though the fake hand replaced my own left
hand.
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hand, the more intense were their experiences of dis-
ownership for their biological hands; and (3) that dis-
ownership was not only reflected by questionnaire
response, it was also reflected by OT and ID. That is,
participants proved quite capable of identifying, while
undergoing the experience, when the disownership
illusion began, and they did so in such a way that
was consistent with their after-the-fact questionnaire
responses.
Conclusions
Contrary to the conclusions reached by Schutz-Bosbach
et al. (2009), Folegatti et al. (2009), and de Vignemont
(2011), our results suggest that in standard versions of
the RHI, at least when the experiment is focused on the
left hand, disownership experiences for the biological
hand can occur. When standard RHI induction proce-
dures are applied to the left hand, if the rubber hand is
experienced as owned, it tends to follow that the bio-
logical hand will be experienced as alien. Even when care
is taken to ensure that participants report not what is
judged to be the case but what is experienced, they have
proven quite capable of reporting the start, the end, and
the duration of disownership experiences. Indeed, mul-
tiple follow-up questionnaire responses are consistent
with these online reports.
Endnotes
1The authors are grateful to an anonymous reviewer
who emphasized this concern about the replicability of
these findings.
AppendixTable 1 Questionnaire used in Experiments 1, 2, and 3
Adapted from Longo et al. (2008)
Ownership 1. It seemed like I was looking directly at my own hand,
rather than at a rubber hand.
2. It seemed like the rubber hand began to resemble my
real hand.
3. It seemed like the rubber hand belonged to me.
4. It seemed like the rubber hand was my hand.
5. It seemed like the rubber hand was part of my body.
Disownership 6. It seemed like I was unable to move my hand.
7. It seemed like I could have moved my hand if I had
wanted.
8. It seemed like I couldn’t really tell where my hand was.
9. It seemed like my hand was out of my control.
10. It seemed like my hand was moving towards the
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